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From "Tiryagyoni" through "Animal" to "Ferus" 
-A Critique of Western Religious Thinking with L. Tolstoy, V. 
Rozanov, and F. Kafka. -
Takayuki Yokota-Murakami 
The word "animal" derives from the Latin "anima" and it means, as everyone knows, "a living or 
breathing thing," that is, "al living things," including humans. A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in 
the Principal Indo-European Languages notes: "[Words like Latin anima] mean properly any'living 
creature," man included" (137). This was, probably, the most primordial sense of an "animal." 
The Latin language, however, had another series of terms, denoting "animal": ferus and bestia. 
Ferus refers specifically to "wild animal," as opposed, one should imagine, to domestic animals. 
Naturallly, since a human-being is a civilized animal, ferus does not include humans. Concerning 
加stia,A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms writes: "[Latin bestia is] used of al animals exlusive of 
man. French bete, Italian bestia, English beast are al, of course, decendants of Latin bestia. (A 
Dictionary also says that Germanic words are, probably, from the same root as the Latin bestia.) Both 
ferus and bestia mean a "wild animal" (as opposed to a domestic animal) and do not include a human-
being. 
Since stockbreeding was, obviously, mankind's later development, a sign, incidentally, of 
civilization, one is tempted to hypothesize that speakers of the proto-Indo-European language 
originally did not distinguish a man, a living thing, from an animal, also a living thing, but that, 
possibly, together with the emergence of stockbreeding, began to distinguish between a domestic 
animal from a wild animal and, accordingly, between a human-being and an animal in general. 
Curiously, these layers of conceptions, that is to say, the foundational semantic layer, conceiving 
both humans and animals indiscriminately as living beings and the more recent layer, distinguishing 
these two, are reproduced in some modem European languages as well. For intance, the semantic 
trajectory of the English word animal attests to this. OED gives its meaning as "a living being" dating 
from 1368 whereas the sense of "lower animal; a brute, or a beast, asdintinguished from man" dates 
from 1600. (In fact, Shakespeare's As You Like Itis the first occurrence that OED records.) 
In contrast, one finds a tendency to equate a man and an animal in the "Eastern" traditions. In 
Sanskrit, the word praJJin, indicating "animal," d<~rives from the root praJJa-, to breathe, following 
exactly the same logic as "animal", meant "living creature, man or beast" (A Dictionary of Selected 
Synonyms [129]). This original usage in Sanskrit is,, obviously, conveniently in line with the traditional 
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Buddhist idea, foregrounding the theory of the eternal reincarnation in its clear contrast to the Judeo-
Christian conception, where God created man in His likeness which other animals do not possess. For 
Buddhism, any being eternally continues its reincarnations, at one time into a human-being, at another 
into an animal. The difference between a man and an animal is contingent. 
I am not trying to draw an essentialist, blanket dinstinction between the "Eastern" and "Western" 
paradigms, though. Buddhism has its own discriminating perspective towards animals: beasts are 
lower creatures that men degenerate into and reincarnate as. Some Sanskrit terms, denoting "animal," 
do exclude human-beings. Tirya邸 oni,also meaning "animal," derives from a word-root, meaning 
"horizontal." An animal is, whether it is a quadruped, a snake, or bird, a creature that moves 
horizontally whereas a man is erect. Sanskrit is not free from antropocentrism. 
Notwithstanding, I should say that the conceptual difference between Judeo-Christianity that 
irrevocably differentiates an animal from a man as a creature without a soul and Buddhism that sees 
both an animal and a man as miserable creatures within the cycle of metempsychosis is not to be 
overlooked or dismissed. 
Now, returning to the "Western" conception that draws a boundary between a man and an animal, 
what has been the philosophical rationales for that distinction, other than the Judeo-Christian belief of 
man's connection to God or man's possession of a soul? Derrida in his essay "The Animal that 
Therefore I Am," criticizes the "Western" convention of defining an animal as a creature that does not 
think, reason, or talk [rationally, that is] (121). In other words, traditionally, logos or language has 
been considered as a distinctive feature of a human-being. Kojeve in Introduction to the Reading of 
Hegel maintains that "a man without freedom is but an animal" (111). A capacity to laugh is evoked 
by Bergson as a human trait. 
Apart from these philosophical considerations, a popular distinction between a man and an animal 
has concerned sexuality. The term, "animal apetite'"'attests to this. This view may have originated from 
the more philosophical idea, already mentioned, that a man is a living creature with reason. Animals, 
in contrast, merely follow their instinct, inclusive of sexual instinct. OED records the usage from 1588 
in the sense of an "animal," referring "contemptuously or humorously [to] a human being who is no 
better than a brute, or whose animal nature has the ascendancy over his reason." This dating of 1588 
coincides with OED's listing for the meanings of the adjective "animal" taken from the 1633 and 1651 
texts. The explanations OED gives for these meanings are, respectively, "of or pertaining to the 
functions of animals; or of those parts of the natun~of man which he shares with the inferior animals 
[Thus opposed to intellectual and spiritual]" and;''carnal, fleshly, as opposed to moral, spiritual." In 
English, at least, the sense of "animality" in the sense of carnal lust, as opposed to spirituality, which 
thus derived from ideas of such human charateristics as "intellect" or "reason," emerged early in the 
seventeenth century. 
This new sense appears to have arisen in the Protestant discourse. Havelock Ellis in his Studies in 
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the Psychology of Sex writes: 
In Protestant countries the influence of the Reformation, by rehabilitating sex as natural, 
indirectly tended to substitute in popular feeling towards sex the opprobrium of sinfulness by 
the opprobrium of animality ... Nowadays indeed, whenever the repugnance to the sexual 
side of life manifests itself, the assertion nearly always made is not so much that it is'sinful' 
as that it is'beastly.'It is regarded as part of man which most closely allies him to the lower 
animals. (Studies in the Psychology of Sex 3; 129-30). 
Therefore, although we tend to think that the concept of "animal lust" isancient and that it has 
been perpetuated by Judeo-Christianity for milleniums, it may be a rather recent development, 
appearing only in the seventeenth century. 
While this remains a hypothesis and the purpose of this paper is not to verify it, we do find many 
proponents of such an idea of "animal sexuality" in "modem" writers, not classical. I shall limit myself 
to the writer among the Western literati, who was, probably, the most adamant in his ascetic ideals and, 
at the same time, was the most influential, Lev Tolstoy. 
After 1880s, Tolstoy made a significant religious turn and in terms of sexual issues began to take 
a radically ascetic attitude, strictly adhering to the ideals of the New Testament. He renounced al 
sexual acts as against the teaching of Christ and his disciples. It was a fundamentalist, rather than a 
revolutionary, move, literally following the early Christian ascetic thought. Tolstoy's biographer, 
Wilson writes: "There is nothing in [Tolstoy's] ethical view which would not have found an echo in 
St. Paul, in Clement of Alexandria, in Tertullian, in St. Augustine. It is, infact,'mere Christianity"' 
(377). 
Tolstoy thus preaches his fundementalist asceticism according to the Gospels, prohibiting any 
sexual intercourse, even within Church sanctioned marriages. With quotes from Matthew as epigraphs 
("[W]hosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery" and "If the case of the 
man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry"), Tolstly simply and literally reiterated the ascetic 
Christian discourse. However, he introduced a new dimension to it, that is, the association of it with 
animality. As I suggested, this was a later invention., not to be found in St. Paul, Clement of Alexandria, 
Tertullian, or St. Augustine. For instance, inthe novel The Kreutzer Sonata Tolstoy describes the first 
sexual encounter of the hero's wife and her paramour thus: 
From the very first moment that his eyes met those of my wife, I saw that the beast which 
lurked in them both, regardless of al social conventions and niceties, asked,'May I?', and 
answered,'Oh, yes, certainly.'(88) 
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Although Tolstoy does not explicitly refer to it, I suspect that his nagative view on animality may 
have a source in St. John's Apocalypsis. The "beast" there is a name for Anti-Christ. It stands to reason 
then that St. John (in the English translation) refers to a "beast," not to an "animal" in Revelation. So 
the text reads: 
And I stood upon the sand of the sea, and saw a beast rise up out of the sea, having seven 
heads and ten horns, and upon his horns ten crowns, and upon his heads the name of blasphemy. 
(Revelation 13: 1 [King James version]) 
St. John's beast, Anti-Christ, however, is not related to sexual license. Its vice is in its blasphemy, 
in its claim to the status of God. But this "beast," in contrast to an "animal," iscategorically different 
from a human-being al the same. 
This image of a "beast" that is never to be identified with a man, that belongs to the different 
category, was to be standardized in variety of "Western" discourses. In the Russian original of The 
Kreutzer Sonata, too, Tolstoy in the above quotation uses the word, zver', corresponding to "beast," 
not zhivotnoe, corresponding to "animal." Naturally, the beast in Revelation in the Russian standard 
translation is also zver'. 
According to OED the word, "beast," just like "animal" "in early times" denoted a living being, 
an animal, "explicity inclusive of man." OED does not explain what is meant by "early times," but 
this definition is followed by the the explanation that "in later times, [the word'beast'was] applied to 
the lower animals, as distinct from man." The usages, given for this sense, are taken from 1220 and 
1300. We are to understand that a beast came to denote purely "a lower animal," not human, in the 
twelfth century. 
Approximately at the same time a "beast" began to denote mainly "a quadruped (as disntiguished 
from birds, reptiles, fishes, insects, etc. as well as from man." 
Further, OED records the sense of "beast," denoting "the animal nature [in man]" from 1667. A 
quote from 1647 which reads: "All histories afford us strange examples of voluptuous beasts" may 
attest to the beginning of the association of"beast" with sexual license. The quote from Shakespeare's 
Othelo, referring to "the beast with two backs," taken from Rabelais's "faire la bete a deux dos," ties 
into this new asscociation. Thus, very roughly speaking, the "Western" culture shifted slowly from the 
idea that man and animal constitute the same group to the distinction between the two. The new notion, 
at first represented in the new meaning of "beast" (at that time, that of "animal" as well) in the sense 
of base desire in the seventeenth century and onwards definitely created the semantic system where 
man and beast (or animal) were sharply differentiated once for al: the former was associated with 
spirituality; the later, sensuality. 
Let us now return to the "Eastern" tradition again. The Japanese term, iki-mono, meaning "living 
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thing," neatly corresponds to "animal," as iki-means "to breathe." Just as an animal means a breathing 
thing, and hence, a living thing, iki-mono means al living beings. But, in contrast to the "Western" 
paradigm, this term never developed a sense ofa "beast," a "quadruped." It remains "al living beings," 
including men, beasts, birds, reptiles, insects, etc., whereas the "Western" strategy was to restrict the 
sense of "animal": from al living things to living being other than men, eventually merely to 
quadrupeds. Let me quickly add, once again, to avoid the sweeping generalization that it was not a 
categorical shift in the West, that is, in some instances, "animal" stil included birds, fish, reptiles, 
insects, etc. (Nietzsche speaks of a snake as a wise animal and Heidegger was much into the behavior 
of bees as animals) and that the "Eastern" tradition also had a similar strategic move. In Japanese there 
is another term, ke-mono, "a hairy thing," which refers to a quadruped and this word normally carries 
a negative nuance. Paradoxially, the negative nuance comes from the Buddhist preachings which 
prohibits meat diet, "paradoxically" in that Buddl1ism has the notion of reincarnation. In Japan this 
negative association (for quadrupeds) was coupled with class descrimination as well as the outcasts 
were engaged in disposition of dead animals (quaclrupeds) and of meat, which were considered to be 
filthy. (This reminds us of the image of a butcher in the West. [By the way I am interested in the 
situation concerning this in Korea where meat diet is accpted.]) However, the man/animal distinction 
was, al the same, far more ambiguous than in the West because of the theory of metempsychosis. And 
animality was never attributed to a lack of reason or a language, but to a lack of empathy: Animals 
were believed to be harsh and cruel in comparison to man who were humaine. Let alone was animality 
associated in Japan or in other Asian countries with sexual license til modernization. 
We will now return to the issue of animality in the sense of sexual lust, as explored by Tolstoy. The 
Kreutzer Sonata and his other ascetic treatises caused a serious scandal not only in Russia, but also in 
Europe in general. Many thinkers reacted fervently in their own ways. One of them was a religious 
philospher, Vasilii Rozanov. His response addressed the issue of "animality" in man, which he sought 
to valorize, rather than depreciate as Tolstoy. In a religious tractatus, In the World of the Ambiguous 
and the Undecided, Rozanov criticizes Tolstoy and calls for the recuperation of animality in man: 
"Seek God in the animal; seek [God] in life; seek Him as the lifegiver" (54; translation is mine). 
Rozanov, however, simply inverts Tolstoy's religious conclusion, relying on his pagan beliefs: 
Christ preached to become spiritual, viz. not to fornicate, not to become an animal; Rozanov 
recommends to become physical and sacred, becoming an animal. The axiological hierarchy is 
inverted, but the man/animal boundary remains intact. 
A similar inversion is curiously observed in contemporary feminist discourse, too. An American 
radical feminist, Andrea Dworkin, devotes a chapter in refuting The Kreutzer Sonata in her polemical 
book, Intercourse, in which she argues that every sexual act is a rape [Incidentally, it is reminiscent of 
Tolstoy's categorical argument that every sexual act without exception is sinful]). 
Dworkin appears to be sympathetic of Tolstoy's critique of animal appetite and of his 
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description of the way it seizes a human-being. Her disssatisfaction is directed at Tolstoy's 
discriminating view on women, viz. Dworkin wishes to restrict Tolstoy's critique to men alone, not to 
women. If Tolstoy is calling for the spiritualization of mankind, for Dworkin, it is men that are trapped 
in animal sexuality while women are spiritual beings. Thus, Dworkin speaks of "Tolstoy's period of 
rut" in which Sophia Tolstaia had to submit to Tolstoy's animal desire. In fact, Sophia recollects, how 
Tolstoy fervently made love to her after working on The Kreutzer Sonata. This surely puts Tolstoy's 
moral preaching in jeopardy, but we are not particularly interested in moralistic criticism of the writer. 
Dworkin repeats the same logic throughou the book, treating Tennesee Williams, Mishima Yukio, 
James Baldwin, et al. For instance, writing of characters in Williams's A Streetcar Named Desire, she 
maintains: "[P]ut against Stanley's animal sexuality, [Blanche's sexuality] emerges as a distinctly 
human capacity" (42) as "with no interior life of human meaning and human remorse, any fuck is 
simply expressive and animalistic" (44). Thus, once again the axiological hierarchy of man and woman 
is overturned, but the binary framework of spituality/physicality, humanity/animality, 
interiority/exteriority is intact. 
The cases of Tolstoy, Rozanov, and Dworkin demonstrate how deeply rooted the Western 
dichotomous thinking of man versus animal. Rozanov's and Dworkin's version of animal philosophy 
was simply the reversal and the recuperation of the dichotomy of animal/man and 
physicality/spirituality. Such a move, naturally, merely recuperates the binary. What we need is a 
dismissal of the dichotomy and a redrawing of the boundaries: man, animal (quadruped), reptiles, 
insects, etc. This brings us back to the original sense of "animal" in Latin, comprising of al the above, 
al living creatures. Also, this issue directs our attention to the Japanese literary tradition in which 
insects occupied a major place and they were ofl:en the soul-mates of "human-beings." The most 
significant example is a medieval story entitled, "A Tale of a Princess Who Loved Insects," included 
in the collection Tsutsumi Chunagon monogatari. The heroine, supposedly a quite charming lady, is 
much fond of catapillars. 
A similar enthusiasm in insects has been observed widely in the history of Japanese culture. To 
name a few examples, I may refer to Katsushika Hokusai's encyclopediac collection of sketches, 
Hokusai manga, which devotes its large section to the loving description of insects. The contemporary 
comic artist, Tedzuka Osamu, was also known to be a big lover of insects. 
Now, I have been following the history of the concept of "animal sexualty" in the West and the 
concurrent conceptual exclusion of men, birds, reptiles, birds, insects, etc. from the category of 
"animal" (that is, anything other than "quadrupeds" from the concept "animal"). 
Earlier, we have traced the literary versions of asceticism, conneted to "animality," from Tolstoy 
via Rozanov to contemporary feminism. The reference to Russian literature was dictated by my 
familiarity with the given field, but a similar genealogy is, naturally, easily found in other "Western" 
literary traditions. However, the genealogy, as we have ascertained earlier, seems to have an origin in 
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modernity. Tolstoy thought his was a fundamentalist move, that he was recuperating the original idea 
found in the Gospels. As a matter of fact, his move was protestant and reformationist (which, actually, 
is in line with his strict adherence to the Biblical text). 
Thus, we have observed paradigm shifts in the Western thought, concerning animality. One 
concerned the semantic shift of an "animal" from a living being in general (including a man) to an 
animal other than a human-being, especially, a quadruped. Another is a new association of animality 
with base sexuality. These two paradigm shifts, however, appear to have taken place approximately at 
the same time, and at an unexpetedly late stage of history, sometime in the seventeenth century and 
onwards. That is to say, these paradigm shifts are, more or les, products of modernity. 
In Japan, too, the association of animality with base sexuality was, on the whole, a modern 
phenomenon. The term,juyoku, animal apetite, although it was sometimes used in the popular didactic 
fiction in the early nineteenth century (for instance, Shogakkan's Great Japanese Dictionary cites 
Takizawa Bakin's Kinsei setsu bishonen roku as the earliest example), was propagated mostly in the 
moralistic discourse of Protestant writers in the second half of the nineteenth century after the access 
to Western religious discourse. In it clearly the concept of "animal apetite" was conceptualized in its 
binary opposition to spiritual love. For instance, a Quaker thinker and poet, Kitamura Tokoku, wrote 
in an influential essay, discussing the popular fiction of the pre-modern period: 
Bear in mind how far apart love is from lust in literature: lust is the liberation of the basest 
brutality of mankind while love is the exaltaition of the spiritual beauty of mankind. To describe 
lust is to expel mankind into the bestial world of corruption. To describe true love is to equip 
a human being with beauty and spirit. Any author who is an encourager and an interpreter of 
lust thus turns man into a lesser creature and impairs love, which ought to be most beautiful 
and most wonderful in literature (64). 
Animal appetite was, thus, a product of the Protestant, bourgeois romantic love ideology. 
However, what were the sources of Tokoku's declaration is not particularly clear. Tokoku was an 
ardent reader of Ralf Emerson and his writings on this topic are believed to have been influenced by 
Emerson's essay, entitled "Love." In the essay, Emerson speaks of deification of love, its spiritual 
aspect, and the rejection of carnal lust and of body in general, and so on. He does not refer to animality, 
though. Alice Stockham, an American gynecologist, whose ascetic treatise, Tokology, Lev Tolstoy 
read with much interest and sympathy while writing The Kreutzer Sonata, propounded chastity, sexual 
modesty (even among the married couples), and spiritualization of love, but unexpectedly she spoke 
of sexuality of animals as purely neutral. She writes: 
Among the animals, except for the very few cases among the domestic animals, a female 
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animal accepts a male animal for a sexual act only for the reproduction of a species. Such a 
rule, except for the infrequent exceptions, exists among the primitive peoples of mankind as 
well. Only the civilized peoples, who pride themselves for their religious and moralistic 
principles, propagates others and in practice themselves adhere to the view that pleasure of 
sexual demand for a human-being should not be restricted, depending on certain occasions, 
and argue, as if such is a law of nature (141-42). 
For the Quaker genecologist it is man, not animal, that actually has animal appetite. And, possibly, 
relying on Rousseau, a civlized man is criticized. Thus, the man/animal dichotomy that was translated 
into the civilization/nature dichotomy or into the high/low dichotomy is overturned. But stil, the idea 
that it is animal that is in the sphere of "nature" isretained. Itis better to be natural and animalistic 
than to be civilized and human. 
The exact discursive relationship of the Japanese moralism and the Western Puritanical thoughts, 
in the former's new formulation of animal sexuality is, thus, stil to be established, but doubtlessly the 
connection of animality and (pervert) sexuality was an unexpectedly recent phenomenon both in the 
West and in the East. I just suggest here that, tomy view, this liason was, probably, much reinforced 
by the theory of evolution, which hierarchized living beings. Birds, reptiles, amphibians, insects, and 
so on, were now considered as "living beings" in the lower rudders of the evolutionary development. 
They were farther away from human-beings. In contrast, quadrupeds were now, in fact, closer to 
mankind. In this evolutionary sheme, I believe, the idea of animal sexuality developed. And, I also 
believe, that it has much to do with the imagination concerning a sexual act. That is to say, the 
approximity to humanity is a correlate of whether a sexual act of any species is imaginable or not, that 
is, a sexual act in the likeness of human-beings. One can imagine a sexual act of a quadruped. That is 
the very condition of bestiality. Also, one speaks of a canine position of sex. This anatomical 
"closeness" is, I hold, the basis for the modem concept of "animal sexuality" and also for the human 
abhorrence of it. A quadruped is a human-being's Other with the capital O and that explains our anxiety 
and our moralistic antagonism for these animals. 
Earlier I referred to the pre-modem novelist Takizawa Bakin, who was, possibly, the first Japanese 
author to have used the term, "animal appetite." And it is significant that he is the aurhor of the 
fabulous Nanso satomi hakken den, the legend of the eight samurai-knights who are born of the union 
between the princess Fusehime and her faithful dog. We do not conceive of a sexual act of an ant or a 
bee. That is why they are outside our imagination of"animal sexuality." 
But in fact, we do conceive. In a seventeenth century great prosaic Ihara Saikaku writes in the 
preface to his treatise in defence of gay love that homosexulity is superior to heterosexuality as a 
dragonfly makes love in the way homosexuals are engaged in sex: nad since Japan is a rice-growing 
country and dragonflies dwell in rice fields, they represent our national spirit and demonstrate the 
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supriority of male love: "In the beginning when gods illuminated the heavens, Kuni-tokotachi was 
taught the love of boys by a wagtail bird living on the dry riverbed below the floating bridge of heaven. 
From this sprang his love for Hi-no-chimaru. Even the myriad insects preferred the position of boy 
love. As a result, Japan was called'The Land of Dragonflies'" (51). The Japanese were imagining 
sexual acts of insects. This is also a significant fact in uderstanding the different attitude in their 
formulation (or un-formulatoin) of animal sexuality. 
So far we have historicized the concept of animal sexuailty in parallel with the semantic change 
in the notion of animals, from al living things to quadrupeds, both occurring fairly recently. It is now 
apt to take a look at the movement in the inverse direction, that is to say, the expansion of the category 
of animal, to include insects and what not. I am referring here to Franz Kafka's Metamorphosis. (P6) 
Gregor Samsa turns a beetle, but his life as an insect is constantly conceptualized as that of an 
animal. When the metamorphosis first takes place, the chief clerk's comment is "That is a voice of an 
animal." As Samsa listens to his sister Grete playing violin, the author asks "Was he an animal if music 
could captivate him so?" When the sister finally decides to get rid of him, she explains, "We've only 
harmed ourselves by believing it for so long. How can that be Gregor? If it were Gregor he would 
have seen long ago that it's not possible for human beings to live with an animal like that and he would 
have gone of his own free will." 
Kafka thus recuperates the meaning of "animal," possibly including al living things; at least, 
including insects as well. But he stil bestializes living beings other than "human-beings," as 
something untolerable, creepy, alien, unheimlich, restoring the Judeo-Christian antropocentrism. 
Nevertheless, Kafka's recuperation opens up a farther possiblity of breaking through the modem 
Western conception of animality. We are naturally referred, through Kafka, back to Ovid's 
Metamorphoses, where conversions of men into al living things, not only to quadrupeds, are richly 
described. Men change into birds, snakes, fish, flowers, trees, and so on, or sometimes even into a 
non-ogranic being such as a river or a rock. Ovid is, obviously, relying on the ancient "Western" belief 
in metempsychosis, to which adhered philosphers like Pytagoras and Plato. The shifting identities 
between men and "animals" or other living beings were thus commonly believed in the classical, pre-
Christian "Western" world, the fact, corresponding to the semantic trajectory of the word "animal" 
that we have confirmed at the beginning.1 However, the belief in metamorphoses survived in folk-
tales, or in the literary imagination of various writers, including John Donne, Edgar Allan Poe, and 
James Joyce. 
I would like to conclude my paper in my attempt at subverting the Western anthropocentrism, the 
othering of animals and the dismissal of insects, drawing a comparison between the European ascetic 
and dichotomous conceptions and the Japanese more ambiguous beliefs and perspectives, by returning 
1 Here one can conceive of metamorphoses in the other direction, to: totemism. In totemism man is a bird, a snake, 
a fox, etc. turning into a man. 
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to Kojeve, who saw the end of History and the end of Man in the Japanese society. 
For Kojeve, nature is eternal and man is a being in Time. The end of man and history is inevitable. 
Now, man in Kojeve's view, is Action in negation, the subject opposed to the object, a self-
consciousness that is bound to change nature, something that an animal does not possess. It is 
significant that Kojeve speaks of animal desire in this connection. Animals consummate desire by 
devouring or by satisfying their sexual desire. But by so doing, they are dependent on the objects. 
Human desire transcends the objects by being directed not towards the objects, but towards another 
Desire, thus becoming self-conscious. Kojeve visited Japan in 1959 and became convinced that such 
transcendental, human desire does not exist in Japan and the end of History had in fact taken place in 
Japan. He explains: "[In Japan] I was able to obse1-ve a Society that is one of a kind, because it alone 
has for almost three centuries experienced life at the'end of History'—that is, in the absence of al civil 
or external war .... [In'Post-Historical Japan']. [s]nobbery in its pure form created disciplines negating 
the'natural'and'animal'given which in effectiveness far surpassed those that arose, in Japan or 
elsewhere, from'historial'Action—that is, from warlike and revolutionary Fights or from forced Work" 
(161). 
It is significant in this connection that Kojeve·•s notion of animal involved living creatures other 
than quadrupeds. He describes the world after the end of Man in this way: "men would construct their 
edifices and works of art as birds build their nests and spiders spin their webs, would perform musical 
concerts after the fashion of frogs and cicadas, would play like young animals, and would indulge in 
love like adult beasts" (159; although I should acid he talks about sexual acts of beasts, but not of 
cicadas). Remarkably Kojeves notion of animal includes birds, spiders, frogs, and cicadas. 
The Japanese philosopher, Azuma Hiroaki, borrows and develops Kojeve's idea and argues that 
otaku, cybor-freaks of Japan, are now animals in this sense. I hold that Azuma misinterprets Kojeve 
in this respect, though. The French philospher did not maintain that Japanese had truned animals; 
Kojeve thinks that post-historical Man remains human al the same. He speaks of"the Japanese nobles, 
who ceased to risk their lives and yet did not for that begin to work" and they were, Kojeves writes, 
"anything but animal" (161). Kojeve is speaking of a new man in the post-historical period in 
differentiation from a Historical man that has been opposed to "nature" and "animal." 
Leaving this misunderstanding aside, Azuma develops a unique view that the Japanese otaku are 
snobs in the post-historical periods, who are interested only in consumptions and in spontaneous 
consummation of sexual desire. It should be marked here, though, that consummation of sexual desire 
implied here is not the "natural" consummation, but the cybor, fantastic, and imaginary consummation. 
Otaku are notriously interested and sexually stimulated by 2D, that is, flat, not 3D, realistic, 
representaions of sexual objects. They are highly voiced about their indifference to the real objects of 
sex. Such desire is different from both of the two types of desire, described by Kojeve: animal desire 
and human desire. The former is directed and consummated by the objects. The later, while being 
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opposed to the (real) objects of deisre, eventually transcends them. Otaku's desire is the one without 
an object. 
In the construction of sexuality, otaku discourse significantly diverts away from the conventional 
conceptual frameworks such as spirit, body, nature, etc. In this connection I can refer to a work like 
Ghost in the shell that, assumedly, typically demonstrate a new, or revised, conception of spirit, body, 
nature, etc. The main characters are "fortified men,," with steel-hardened "shell." One's body is closer 
to that of an insect or a crustacean with an empty shell than to an animal with flesh. 2 The mental 
activities are mostly reduced to computer programs, implanted in the shell, but there appears to exist 
a "ghost," which functions in a way inexplicable for digital programming, something that may 
correspond to what we used to call "spirit." 
One of my basic theses of this paper has been that the conceptualization of animal (as Other) has 
been a correlate of the notions of sexuality. The new form of sexuality is emerging in Japan that is not 
subject to the binary oppositions of civilized/barbarian, human/animal, spiritual/material, 
artificial/natural, interior/exterior, etc. The complc~te revision of animality together with the end of 
Man may in fact be taking place. 
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